Take-home Midterm

Since I have to write this stupid parrot-the-prof midterm, I might as well double it up by posting here, since really it isn't a bad paper, except for the parroting part, and it won't be too long. I'll post it as I write - I've only got the intro done so far. Tell me what you think.

According to the theoretical framework for analyzing the roots of radicalism, four principle conditions are known to breed radicalism. These conditions include neo-colonialism, internal colonialism or poor governance, relative economic poverty or unfair terms of trade, and the perception of threat. All of these conditions need not be present for elements of civil society to radicalize in a given state. However, the more the conditions are filled, the greater the chance and likely magnitude of radical movements become. For radical movements to be successful, dynamic leaders must succeed in leading a significant portion of a country’s civil society underground where it becomes “uncivil society” and usually spirals out of control. Absent either the leaders or the masses, this process fails.

In applying this framework to the Gulf region specifically, empirical experience clearly shows that economic wealth can forestall radicalism. While radical elements exist in most Gulf countries, they are limited to a number of fanatics and ideologues who have failed to form any sort of mass movements or recruit enough followers to pose a serious challenge to the conservative regimes. By contrast, poorer countries of similar culture all around the wealthy Gulf – including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian lands, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia – have experienced overwhelming waves of radicalism in recent years. Thus good governance, favorable terms of trade, and the lack of threats to security have enabled a half dozen unrepresentative governments to stay peacefully in power while most of those around them struggle with or fall to radical movements.

In looking in detail at the case of Oman, the theoretical framework overwhelmingly suggests that no radical movement will take hold in the foreseeable future, because few of the conditions spawning radicalism exist in Oman. The masses, though not nearly as wealthy as their neighbors in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, have not been alienated by the government, and the latter makes pointed efforts to prevent their alienation. By looking at each condition, and then at the way the government has responded to its situation we will see that radicalization is unlikely in Omani civil society.

Of all the conditions, the one most in effect is the presence of neo-colonialism and foreign elements. Both the existence of American military bases (Schmitt & Shanker; Sanger & Shanker) and the plethora of foreign workers in Oman (Europa, 840) occasionally arouse the ire of native Omanis. Western influence, most notably including Western oil extraction companies such as Shell (Youssef) and the American military, has been known to trigger nationalist reactions in many parts of the world, but usually when coupled with unfair terms of trade, as in the Gulf in the 1970’s, which are absent in present-day Oman.

The second condition, internal colonialism, is entirely absent in the Omani case. The Sultan, though an absolute monarch, knows that the most serious threat to his rule would come from triggering revolts in the mountainous interior or in Dhofar, as happened in the 1950’s and 1970’s, respectively (EIU, 2). Political representation has been expanded in the last decade, with a significant number of citizens eligible to vote for a consultative council, al-Majlis al-Shura. While Oman is far from democratic, the Sultan’s reign continues to benefit the country, and no significant threat to the monarchy has developed in the last quarter century.

The third and fourth conditions, economic deprivation and perception of threat, are also entirely absent in the Omani case. The government has done an admirable job in using their relatively limited oil reserves responsibly (Europa, 839), and is well on its way to diversifying away from the non-renewable oil and gas resources (Youssef) which propelled the economy’s growth to seventh in the Middle East in per-capita GDP (EIU, 1). Likewise, close ties with the U.K. and U.S.A. for over 100 years coupled with a lack of belligerent neighbors have made Oman a very secure location. The reunification of neighboring Yemen removed the one credible threat, and Omanis will certainly not be motivated to radicalize due to perception of threat.

Sultan Qaboos, who took power from his unpopular father in a 1970 palace coup (Europa, 827), has been handed a very favorable situation, and has done much to reinforce his nation’s stability and his own position. By responding to the populace’s demands, providing free health care and education (EIU, 6), and allowing most of civil society to remain free the sultan has succeeded in forestalling the creation of an underground, “uncivil society” that could threaten stability. Just as there are conditions that engender radicalism, there are conditions that disperse it. Two in particular – wealth and good leadership – have kept the state of Oman from experiencing radicalism despite being in a very volatile region of the world. The future prospects of Oman differ little from the present reality, and the forward-thinking government is doing all it can to ensure that Omanis have employment and that the economy moves away from dependence on non-renewable resources. If the government continues to prevent poverty, no radical movements are likely to arise in Oman at any point.