50 Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong

My hero in journalism, Thomas Friedman, is reporting from the Western Front. He reports that France, if not Iraq, is shocked and awed. Maybe it's just my love for all things Friedman, but I think his op-ed piece touches a very deep chord in the transatlantic relationship that has made the U.S. and France allies since 1778.

For now, though, Europeans are too stunned by this massive exercise of unilateral U.S. power to think clearly what it's about. I can't quite put my finger on it, but people here seem to feel that a certain contract between America and the world has been broken. Which is why so much is riding, far beyond Iraq, on what the Bush team builds in Iraq.

The idea occurred to me today that this is precisely what Rumsfeld et al intended. It's become clear by now that this geopolitical strategy - preemption, unilateralism - has been a decade in the making, spearheaded by the likes of Perle, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz. This war was intended to have global, not just regional effects. And it is. The world is seeing not only the massive power of the U.S. - which spends just 4% of its GDP to have a military budget bigger than the rest of the world put together!

The shock and awe campaign displays two things prominently. The strength of the U.S. army and, more importantly, our willingness to use it. This may play well with Muammar Qaddafi and Bashar al-Assad. But it is definitely shocking and awing France, Russia, Germany and our other erstwhile allies. They now have ample reason to believe that the U.S. doesn't need them, and they know more than ever that they need us. That is rarely a good situation between allies, especially since the military imbalance is not reflected in economic, social or diplomatic arenas. The U.S. may be set up for a period of isolation and frustration like we have not experienced since before the Spanish-American War.

Unfortunately, it's not entirely clear that the Kim Jong Ils of the world have been unduly impressed. Other state sponsors of terrorism, who are less isolated than Iraq was, may have confidence that they will be able to rally a coalition against the U.S. (not militarily, but perhaps economically) that could thwart U.S. intentions, and put their regime in the good graces of the rest of the world by default. If Saddam had been slightly less odious, this would have been a much harder sell for the Rumsfeld crowd.

Instant Replay calls for a vote of no-confidence in the Rumsfeld Doctrine. Chime in.