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The following is an exerpt from my Middler Year paper, a 6,000 word piece on the failure of sanctions in Iraq. This section is the lynchpin - and I completely rewrote it from my last draft, so we'll see what my prof says. I'm not particularly proud of it, but it's legitimately my work, so tell me what you think.

Having discussed the failure of sanctions to accomplish American goals in Iraq and other cases and examined to date and possible future progression of the current War on Terrorism I will now proceed to recommend a better course for U.S. policymakers. I will suggest an alternative policy, not reliant on sanctions, for the United States and its allies in 1990 and ’91. Using the same principles I will recommend how sanctions should be used – and when they should not be used – in the current conflict and the more distant future.

Past: What We Should Have Done in Iraq

To take my case study of the Second Gulf War to its conclusion I must now offer an alternative to the historical case of limited military action, sanctions, and punitive air strikes. Some might accuse me of taking unfair shots at U.S. foreign policy with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. However, Iraq can serve as a specific example of how my ideas might be implemented in a similar, future case.

First of all, Saddam Hussein himself should have been a target. While assassination is internationally illegal, and could not be conducted as part of a UN-authorized action, kidnapping is legal after an international tribunal warrant has been issued. Furthermore, nobody would take the U.S. to court if Saddam were accidentally killed in the bombing of a suspected military establishment.

To kill two birds with one stone, a conventional military conquest of Iraq would have both captured Saddam and attained the next goal, overthrow of the powerful Iraqi military. The Republican Guard especially is a seasoned military machine accustomed to holding power second only to the President’s, and is not in the least under civilian control. To destroy the expansionist, dictatorial power structures more than Saddam alone had to be removed. New, democratic institutions, a civilian-controlled military, and a stable economy could only be attained after flushing out the old regime entirely.

Fewer civilian deaths are likely to have resulted from a full-scale invasion in 1991 than the decade of sanctions-and-strikes warfare that followed 1991 in reality (Weiss, 199 p.506-7). Though reliable figures are hard to come by in Iraq, estimates of deaths bounce around in the six- and low seven-digit ranges. By contrast, few recent wars have resulted in even five-digit civilian losses. Thus, even a low estimate of deaths due to sanctions greatly exceeds a high estimate of deaths due to conventional military action.

Actual military conquest of Iraq would have been easy. The transitional, pre-democratic government would have drawn from apolitical elders and municipal leaders to guide Iraq towards a long-awaited peacetime. Hopefully, individuals of integrity and accustomed to leadership would grow into political roles and build the political structure of the transitional democracy. Civil organizations would be encouraged, with the goal of integrating Iraqis into the fabric of their government and empowering them to run their country themselves.

Present: Choosing the Targets

Instances of sanctions in the War on Terrorism should be few and far between. As asserted by Patterson (1995) and Weiss (1999), “sanctions should stand in sharp distinction to military force, whereas too often they are a prelude to war” (p. 506). As shown in the Libyan and similar experiences, minor goals, not involving direct threats to the regime, have a greater chance of success than major goals (Schwartzman, 2001 p.133). Thus, sanctions should be considered as a primary policy tool in situations where military invasion is out of the question, but a minor goal needs to be accomplished. The obvious scenario is if Osama bin Laden escapes to an Islamic country that is ambivalent towards bin Laden and the U.S. The economic impacts – or even the threat –of sanctions could be just enough to spur a Malaysian or Yemeni government, for instance, to cooperate with the CIA.

Sanctions should not be used as a prelude to invasion or for major policy objectives, such as the overthrow of an enemy regime. Hardnosed diplomacy can isolate and threaten a potential military target without complicating the situation. Overthrow of enemy regimes must be accomplished by supporting domestic rebellion or invading outright. The Bush administration will assuredly be tempted to sanction some miscreant or other as the easy way to deal with a situation, but I trust that its close connections to the first Bush administration and its mistakes in Iraq will help this administration avoid similar mistakes. I would not be surprised, however, if a new president in 2005 without commitment to the War on Terrorism used sanctions as a halfway measure in a phase-out of the war.

Future: Sanctions as a Tool in the 21st Century

The lure of sanctions has always been the ease with which they can be imposed. However, as we witnessed in the case of Iraq, easy imposition does not translate into painless maintenance or meaningful results. In fact, the evidence suggests that sanctions are used more for convenience than for substance. I do not deny that sanctions have a place as a tool of U.S. foreign policy. However, that place should be as a constituent part of a comprehensive program. Sanctions must not be used in an attempt to reach large-scale goals, as in Iraq. Even when the alternatives may not be attractive, the fact remains that by and large, sanctions do not work.

In addressing future concerns the question of sanctions’ side effects arises. Sanctions do not generally create a big stir internationally as does open warfare. In the case of Iraq, though, the sanctions regime has been a sore spot in UN Security Council relations for most of the last decade. Thus, sanctions are neither much better nor much worse than warfare in terms of international criticism. However, sanctions do create circumstances distinctly unfavorable to America in victim countries and countries close to them. By engendering poverty on a massive scale, America, which is perceived as both the source and the goal of material wealth, gains an unfavorable reputation. By causing pain to entire populations instead of just enemy regimes, we create nations full of anti-Americans.

In many cases, the opposite could be accomplished. For instance, so far in Afghanistan, Americans have been welcomed as liberators from the Taliban. Contrast that with the anti-American attitudes prevalent in Iraq or Syria. Where we have imposed long-term poverty, we have created enemies. Where we have brought free food and fought alongside the local opposition, we have been hailed as rescuers.

September 11 underscored the empowerment of the common individual in making a huge splash or avenging themselves on their perceived enemies. We cannot afford to dismiss the complaints and vitriol of anti-American Iraqis, Pakistanis or Palestinians. Those who have nothing and are willing to die for revenge are the deadliest tools in the hands of Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden. Likewise, while they may not seem to pose the greatest threat to us, they successfully launched the greatest assault on America since the Civil War.

Therefore, sanctions should be used sparingly and only where clearly demonstrated to be the best possible option. Sanctions should always be used as part of a comprehensive goal-attainment program. Before imposing sanctions, the U.S. or UN Security Council should submit a list of clearly defined and attainable conditions. If those conditions are met, the sanctions must be lifted. Thus, targets have a motive to comply, and sanctions are not simply maintained as a form of punishment.