| Unstable Dictatorship: the Likelihood of Instability in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
In examining the factors for stability in a country as controversial as Iraq we must look at the country from many different angles. From the perspective of the Iraqi government specifically, four possibilities or realities of instability exist, on two fronts. First of all, domestic stability could be upset either by a low-scale campaign of domestic terrorism against the government and infrastructure or by a full-scale attempt at revolution. At the same time, the threat of severe dislocation exists from outside powers, including both Iraq’s neighbors and the remote coalition against which Iraq fought the Second Gulf War. The U.S.A. and U.K. specifically have made the fourth possibility of instability a reality: frequent, but low-scale military actions within Iraq by outside powers.
For the populace of Iraq another significant source of instability exists: Saddam Hussein’s government. For Kurdish and Shia minorities in the north and south, that possible source of instability has been a reality for at least a decade. This paper, however, will focus on the prospects of the Saddam Hussein regime, and will essentially take the government’s side in blaming internal instability on agitating minorities, not government oppression of those minorities.
In order to find the probability that Iraq will suffer from any of the four noted threats to stability, we must first look at the root causes of each type, and what environments are conducive to an escalation in that type of instability. To this end, we will examine theories of roots of radicalism and revolution, and then at what legitimate threats exist in each of those categories for contemporary Iraq. Then we will look at Iraq’s history of making enemies and what actions it or others might take to escalate or mitigate the tension between Iraq and others, as well as what circumstances in the region might lead towards another war involving Iraq. By examining the likely roots of instability and whether those roots exist in Iraq, we can make reasonable predictions as to the country’s future prospects.
Domestic terrorism is the most common of the sources of instability, and does not generally represent a critical threat to most regimes. This type of destabilization is characterized by militant radical movements that have not gained enough mass support to stage a revolution or secession, and seek to gain international recognition, popular support, or government concessions by violent means. As Ted Goertzel points out in the journal “Terrorism”, these “movements are usually much weaker than the government forces opposing them” and they “find it much easier to attack unprotected civilians rather than military units” (7). Goertzel goes on to cite the general ineffectiveness of such tactics at reaching tangible goals, and in his conclusions posits that “if a revolutionary movement is too weak to attack military targets but can only place bombs on airplanes or gun down civilian bus passengers, then it is not ready for armed struggle” (10). Needless to say, few embryonic resistance movements in the Middle East have followed Goertzel’s advice. However, the ethics of resistance is tangential to a point more important for our purposes; that is, the roots of radical movements.
Revolutionary movements are based on the radicalization of a segment of the populace. Radicalization occurs when elements of civil society are forced underground, where they are not subject to examination by and accountability to the rest of society. There, instead of being able to resolve problems based on public dialogue, elements of society radicalize and become “uncivil”, resorting to violence as their means of public expression. When the revolutionary movement fails to reach the critical mass of a widespread, popular uprising, the leaders of the movement often go ahead with violent resistance to the government anyway, hoping that their support will be augmented or that they can gain concessions from the government regardless of their size. Thus, a government can often precipitate violence against itself by repressing civil society and forcing radicalization of groups ideologically or economically dissimilar to the government.
A vital caveat to this process is that while repression breeds radicalism, radical elements are unlikely to either be able to or have the courage to mount violent attacks against government interests when a regime is at its most repressive. Violence tends to flair up when the government loses a measure of control or eases up on its domestic enemies: being radical and often irrational, they take any opportunity to destabilize the government even if that opportunity only comes out of the government’s attempt to ease tension (Taylor, 150). This creates a paradox for repressive regimes such as Iraq’s: if they continue to be repressive, they sow a whirlwind; if they allow civil society to express itself they reap the whirlwind they have sown over years past. Thus, the only reasonable way to avoid instability is to allow society freedom within given bounds or to be “massive[ly] and ruthless[ly]” repressive (Beetham, 147). Repression itself, however, often is initiated specifically to combat instability. All this to say there is no easy way out, especially for a regime like Saddam’s, which has repressed Islamists, communists, liberals, and conservatives alike for a quarter-century.
The other source of domestic threats to stability is similar, but on a very different scale. Mass revolts, in the form of coups, secessionist rebellions, or popular revolutions pose threats of a very distinct nature to governments. Unlike low-scale terrorism and violence revolution is a sudden and severe threat, and generally not solved without complete annihilation of the revolutionary leadership or their ascension into power. Given the inherent difficulty in mobilizing an entire population towards a single goal, revolution is unique, and if it fails the first time around, a resurrection of the same revolution in the near future is unlikely. Thus, the crucial element in analyzing causes of revolution is analyzing factors in mass mobilization. While leadership is crucial to a successful revolution, the leaders without the masses become low-scale violence and terrorism, which we have already discussed. Successful mass mobilization, empirically, is rarer than willing leadership, as testified by the plethora of militant organizations throughout the Middle East and the relative rarity of full-scale revolutions.
Economic, political and social preconditions can all contribute to the likelihood of successful mass mobilization against the government. While economic depravity seems an obvious reason to revolt against a corrupt government, empirical evidence does not necessarily uphold it. Scholars have proposed modified theories, with factors based on poverty instead of poverty itself as a contributor to revolution. The disparity between expectations and reality is cited as a more accurate predictor of the public reaction than the mean poverty level, and scholar Mehran Kamrava attributes legitimacy loss (and thence mobilization) not to “widespread poverty and misery, but rather the endemic fragility of state institutions, and in turn their inability to control and to penetrate civil society, that is the most prevalent cause of revolutions” (20). Kamrava also interestingly links social factors of revolution to spontaneous revolution, arguing that it is “through existing social organizations that the necessary links between revolutionary leaders and the masses are established” (34). Naturally, effective social organization outside the auspices of the incumbent government can contribute to a planned revolution as well, but they are vital to a spontaneous one, where the masses sometimes seem to be leading the leaders. Political theories run the gamut of revolutionary scholarship (Beetham, 220; Kamrava, 44; Motyl, 50; Taylor, 149), and I will not attempt in this space to discuss them. Clearly, though, ideological and political factors are bound to play some role in any unfolding revolution, and I personally suspect that the diversity of theory is due to the subjective nature of revolutionary politics.
Given that the two domestic sources of instability outlined above differ primarily in scale and period, the specific potential threats to Iraq in both the terror or revolutionary spheres can be outlined as one. There are many Iraqi groups opposed to Saddam Hussein’s regime, and all of them would love to see him toppled and themselves in his place. Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) in particular have been in rebellion against the Iraqi state since the early 1980’s (Europa, 2033). Communist, liberal, Islamist, and other political factions exist, primarily outside of Iraq, and are very weak. The Iraqi regime has repressed southern Shi’ites, who comprise over 50% of the Iraqi population (Europa, 2033), to a lesser degree than it has the Kurds, though the former are not a distinct ethnic group and lack a separatist agenda.
Iraq has a history rich in political coups and assassinations, which continued unabated in the 20th century. The decade from 1958 to 1968 was punctuated by three successive coups, all of them military. Since 1968 the Baath Party has ruled Iraq in relative stability, with a peaceful transfer of dictatorial power from Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr to Saddam Hussein in 1979 and frequent elections that without fail affirm the dominance of the Baath Party. Many attempts have been made on Saddam Hussein’s life; assassination or coup plots were foiled in 1979, three in 1995, one in 1996, and two in 2000, and possibly at other times (Europa, 2033-37).
Clearly the government has experience in foiling military coups as well as combating ethnic insurgencies. Were the entire army, or at least the elite Republican Guard, to join in an organized revolution, it is doubtful that the government could survive. However, despite severe sanctions, which could be interpreted as neo-colonialism, extreme internal colonialism, economic deprivation, pitiful terms of trade, and the very justified perception of threats from all over, no legitimate opposition has succeeded in organizing either a long-term (besides in Kurdistan) or large-scale mass revolutionary movement. It is not for lack of motives that no serious revolutionary or terrorist movements have sprouted in Iraq. Some argue that it is for lack of leaders, since the government liberally executes all who oppose it (Europa). However, there seems to be no lack of leaders willing to attempt coups or assassinations, and while there may be no electrifying, charismatic opposition leader, there are plenty of individuals willing to put their lives on the line for a chance to topple Saddam Hussein. I would contend that the opposition has not lacked for leaders, but has been directly prevented from organizing by the calculated repressive actions of the government.
Finally, the future prospects for the Iraqi resistance are no better than the historical results. Despite generous U.S. funding and support of the ex-patriot opposition (Europa, 2041), the latter remains essentially impotent and decidedly remote. With the government’s ability to distribute essential materials as they wish under the oil-for-food program, the populace within Iraq has plenty of incentive to not revolt. The Shi’ite majority, though poorer and less represented than the Sunnis, have not rebelled since the government’s brutal suppression of a U.S.-encouraged revolt in southern Iraq. The Kurdish movements, though they are actually established and functional, are so divided that they fight each other as much as they fight the government (Europa, 2036). Furthermore, Kurdish movements will not gain support from the average Iraqi citizen, and, if successful in fighting the Iraqi government, would demand their own independence, not a change in the Iraqi regime. The only group that could legitimately threaten Saddam Hussein would be another military putsch, this one with sufficient access to the president that they could kill and replace him before the loyalist fraction of the army and Republican Guard could defeat the insurrection. Theoretically, if the government’s revenues dropped to the point where it could no longer exercise effective control over the populace, the resultant easing in repression could lead to an explosion of anti-Saddam sentiment and perhaps a popular revolution, but such a loss of control is not expected in the foreseeable future.
Returning to our theoretical framework for sources of instability, we now turn to the likelihood of instability of an international nature. As with domestic instability, we differentiate between high- and low-scale foreign intervention, as the two have dramatically different effects upon Iraq militarily and politically. Currently, low-scale foreign intervention is a fact, and we will look briefly at its cause and likelihood of continuation before turning to the sensational issue of the likelihood of full-scale foreign military intervention.
The theoretical basis for foreign, and specifically Western, destabilizing intervention in Iraq is relatively simple. Iraq and its neighbors control a very high percentage of the world’s reserves of black crude oil, of great importance to the world economy. While many theories exist explaining American and others’ international interventions, the consensus in the case of Iraq is that national interests govern Western responses to Iraqi actions. While other variables – the situations in Israel/Palestine or Afghanistan, for instance – play a role in U.S. policymaking, oil politics is clearly the most important variable.
The ongoing low-scale foreign intervention in Iraq consists of a United Nations-sponsored sanctions regime and sporadic air strikes by the United States and United Kingdom when Iraqi troops violate imposed demilitarized zones in the north and south of the country. These draconian measures were imposed after the Second Gulf War (1990-91) to punish an unrepentant Iraq for invading neighboring Kuwait in 1990. The cause of this foreign intervention is clearly Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which is a vital oil supplier for the industrialized world, but the future of the sanctions and strikes are much less clear. If, in fear of a full-scale U.S. invasion, the government decides to give U.N. weapons inspectors unlimited access to suspected weapons sites, the sanctions may be lifted and Iraq may be eased back into the good graces of the world community. The level of Iraq’s cooperation with the inspectors, however, would have to be very high for the U.S. and U.K. not to use their U.N. Security Council veto to block a lifting of the sanctions. Thus, the low-scale instability caused by foreign intervention in Iraq can be largely attributed to actions based on respective national interests, and the continuation of the intervention is likely given current trends.
One condition that would end the low-scale intervention in Iraq would be full-scale invasion by the Western powers. Looking at the likelihood of foreign invasion first from an objective point of view, most motives to attack Iraq are likely to be based on past Iraqi aggression. Simply put, Saddam Hussein has long been in the business of making enemies. A year after taking office in 1979 he invaded Iran on weak irredentist claims. After failing to conquer the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan by the war’s end in 1988, he turned on Kuwait with similar motivations and excuses. The ongoing instability and lack of government control over the Kurdish parts of Iraq, which border Turkey, has led to occasional Turkish incursions into Iraq, and a general deterioration of Turkish-Iraqi relations over the past years. With American troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and a lukewarm relationship with the Assad family in Syria, Iraq is almost completely surrounded by unfriendly states.
Of the many who would like to see Saddam Hussein out of power, the only state that has made noise about actually invading in the near future is the United States (Bumiller). At this point it is conjecture as to whether the saber-rattling by George W. Bush, Colin Powell, and company is a precursor to anything serious or merely trying to scare Iraq into cooperating with U.N. weapons inspectors. Besides wanting to remove Saddam Hussein as a threat to the Gulf region, the U.S. has reason to believe that Iraq is sponsoring terrorists and hosts the al-Qaeda organization (Belz, 23; Hedges). If the U.S. invades Iraq, the end of the Saddam Hussein regime is a virtual certainty, and every facet of Iraqi polity would be radically changed overnight. Though some believe U.S. invasion is “highly likely” (E.I.U., 1), there is no way to be certain before the actual events transpire, and conjecture at this stage is unproductive.
In conclusion, the prospects for instability in Iraq are mixed. Instability from terrorism or low-scale domestic insurgency is relatively unlikely, given the high level of repression. At the same time, all the motives for radicalism exist, and given an opportunity the opponents of the regime may become active. Full-scale domestic revolution is extremely unlikely. Not only is there repression, but the government’s tight control over the populace makes mass mobilization against the government virtually impossible. However, in contrast to the stable domestic prospects for Saddam Hussein’s regime are the prospects for internationally-based instability. Low-scale instability, in the form of sanctions and air strikes, are in effect and likely to continue. A full scale invasion is a very real possibility as well, and the threat of it removes a degree of independence from the government, which must now behave in such a way as to increase the odds of dodging a full-scale U.S. invasion.
References
Beetham, David (1991). The Legitimation of Power. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International. Call # JC328.2.B43.1991.
Country Report: Iraq (2002). London: Economist Intelligence Unit. Accessed through NULIS, May 29, 2002.
Belz, M (2001, September 29). More than a Manhunt? WORLD. p. 23-4.
Goertzel, Ted (1988). The Ethics of Terrorism and Revolution. Terrorism, 11, 1-12. Call # HV6000.T5000.v11.
Hedges, C. (2001, November 8). Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism. The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com.
Iraq: Don’t Use Pretext of Terrorism to Attack Us (2001, October 9). The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com.
Kamrava, Mehran (1992). Revolutionary Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Call # HM281.K36.1992.
Motyl, Alexander (1999). Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities. New York: Columbia University Press. Call # HM281.M667.1999.
Orbach, William (1977). To Keep The Peace: The United Nations Condemnatory Resolution. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky. Call # JX.1977.073.
Schmemann, S. (2001, October 10). U.S. Ambassador Warns Iraq Against Stirring Up Trouble. The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com.
Taylor, Stan (1984). Social Science & Revolution. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd. Call # HM281.T35.1984b.
World Report 2001. London: Europa Publications. 47th edition, 2001.
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| Revolution & Evolution: Elite Systems and Political Change in Libya
According to the theoretical framework for analyzing political elite systems, there exist three successive and distinct generations of elites and respective leadership types. Each generation, or genre, of elites has a distinct set of characteristics whereby it can be identified, and which a new regime of that genre can be expected to display. In theory there is a standard progression through the three generations, which may take anywhere from a few years to centuries. However, as we shall see empirically countries in the Middle East fail to follow this theoretical progression in many cases. Nonetheless, the distinction between the three genres is extremely helpful in analyzing current and historical Middle Eastern political systems, and when coupled with a flexible interpretation of the possible progressions can present a theoretical model that meshes well with empirical reality.
The first of the genres of elite systems is labeled “traditional.” The simplest to analyze, a traditional leadership system’s primary characteristic is insulation from change. Everything about the traditional elites contributes to their perpetuation and the exclusion from elite circles of new elements. Traditional elites in the Middle East and elsewhere generally include monarchs and noble classes, which maintain bloodlines and are thus impermeable to non-elites. Religious elites are generally allied with the monarchy, and the two lend each other legitimacy. Traditional elites also legitimize themselves by means of symbols and history, appealing to the national identity of non-elites to ensure submission. In the Middle Eastern world, that often entailed linking the ruling family to the Caliphate or (in Shia states) the Imamate, a strategy that dovetailed with the monarchical alliance with the religious elites. Another characteristic of traditional leadership is a high level of consensus; when consensus is lost, the traditional elite system may be broken. By having homogeneity of opinion, among other things, elites reinforce the impermeability of the structure to potential interlopers.
The second genre in the theoretical progression is “transitional elites”. This elite system, often characterized by military or bureaucratic leadership, comes about as a result of inter-elite conflict, and, as its name suggests, tends to give way to modern elites after a transitional period. In many cases, the inter-elite conflict is caused by a crisis within the traditional elite structure. The transitional leadership takes over from the traditional elite, with the primary goal of solving the crisis. If and when the transitional leadership fails to fulfill their mandate, modern, charismatic leadership takes over. Transitional elite systems are characterized by increased permeability, lack of strong ideology, and a temporary mandate.
Lastly, “modern elites”, which may be democratic, dictatorial, or otherwise, are currently viewed as the final and lasting generation of elite systems. Modern elites are characterized by charismatic, idiosyncratic leaders, whose ascendancy is based on personality and popularity rather than symbolism or crisis resolution, as is the case with the first two genres, respectively. This elite system is based on an increased awareness of the possibility of change, and is the most permeable, theoretically allowing anyone to enter the elite system based on their personality or achievement. As personalities take over the elite system, ideology becomes increasingly important. Most modern elite systems were at their inception radical or revolutionary, whether they be Islamist, communist, liberal, or otherwise. There is a theoretical assumption that modern political systems move towards liberal democracy, as they have in the West. However, dictatorship, whether military or civilian, or theocracy, as in Iran, have proved to be viable modern elite systems in the Middle East and elsewhere, challenging the Eurocentric conceptual framework.
Another challenge to the framework comes in the progression between elite structures. While theory suggests a traditional, transitional, modern progression, empirical evidence shows that this is often an erroneous assumption. In looking briefly at the to-date political development of nineteen countries in the Middle East, the author found that only one (Iraq) has strictly followed the theoretical progression. An additional six, mostly Gulf states, seem to be on track to follow the theoretical progression, but most of those still have predominantly traditional elite systems. Two countries followed very distinct paths, while four others are still too traditional to say that any progression has occurred to date. Six countries, however, seemed to follow a quite different progression with a structure of its own. They went from traditional, to modern, to transitional, in that order. Most experienced revolutions, replacing monarchs with charismatic revolutionary leaders. When those leaders died, in most cases, the same form of government continued, but under successively less charismatic leadership, which portray more characteristics of transitional than modern elites. This represents an alternate progression, varying from theory, but recognizable in its own right.
Libya is one of those countries, though it has not completed that progression, as its revolutionary leader is still alive. Libya had been an Italian colony until the Second World War, and was made an independent state in 1951. A king was appointed, and the country functioned well as a constitutional monarchy, where the king retained ultimate power, until 1969. On September 1st of that year, a group of military officers led by young Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi staged a bloodless coup against the absent king, and completely reorganized the state around their Arab nationalist ideology. Though military, the coup lacked the characteristics of a transitional regime. There was no apparent crisis to be addressed and no inter-elite conflict. Rather, the new regime, which has lasted to this day under the dictatorship of Col Qaddafi, has been ideologically based, idiosyncratic, and bound up in the charismatic leadership of the Colonel (Europa, 735).
Qaddafi’s very distinct brands of Arab nationalism, socialism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Africanism have been rejected by his neighbors by and large, though most have remained on decent terms with Libya throughout his rule. The West, on the other hand, has been very cold towards Qaddafi, whose rule began with the expulsion of foreigners, American and British military bases in particular. Because of Qaddafi’s oddball international politics and overbearing demands for Arab, Maghrebi, or African unity, Libya has become something of a pariah state. However, one is forced to wonder whether the eccentric Qaddafi really minds being a pariah to the West. He has led his country as something bordering on a personality cult for the last 33 years, and is not known for being accommodationist towards any other country. Clearly, this elite system is based on one man’s personality and ideology, and is thus a “modern” elite system.
To look at the future of Libya’s political structure is to look past Qaddafi’s lifespan. There has been no credible threat to his rule, and his people do not seem unsatisfied with their Colonel. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that he will leave office in a coffin, and his inner circle will be left to construct a post-Qaddafi political system, probably with their own political preservation in mind. Based on the experiences of Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Iran in particular, we do not have reason to expect immediate instability. Rather, the appointed heir or heirs to Qaddafi’s position will continue to govern through the same structure that Qaddafi left. However, whomever Qaddafi chooses to succeed him is likely to be less of a dominant personality, less ideological, and more pragmatic, and more focused on retaining power than attaining elusive ideals than Qaddafi is. It is not unreasonable to expect that Libyan leadership will witness a “personality strength decay” as is ongoing in Egypt, Syria, and Iran, with the successions from Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak, from Hafez to Bashar al-Assad, and from Khomeini to Khamenei and Khatami, respectively. The latter leader or leaders in every case tended to slip in the direction of transitional, bureaucratic elite structure, away from the highly personalized modern structures led by Nasser, Hafez al-Assad, and Khomeini. Thus, expect no new Libyan revolution. Libya, if it continues in the alternate elite system progression, will go from modern to transitional, just as it went from traditional to modern in the last century.
References
Economist Intelligence Unit (2001), Libya: Country Profile. Accessed through NULIS, June 2, 2002.
The Middle East and North Africa 2002. London: Europa Publications. 48th edition, 2002.
Holmes, Steven (2002). Libyan Money for Flight 103 Isn't Remorse, U.S. Says. New York Times Online. Accessed June 2, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com. |
