6.26.2002

T - 4

It's now time minus four hours! I'll be off to Logan International Airport within the hour, where I'll get my shoes checked for explosives, my boarding pass, and bored. Then, at 7:25 it's Virgin Atlantic (reportedly the world's most fun airline) to London and British Airways (my personal favorite airline) to Beirut. I'll get there tomorrow evening local time, and be driven to American University in Beirut. I'll pick my key up, and head to Penrose dorm, where I'll be spending the next month and a half. I'll also call my distant family that evening, and probably see them the next day. It's quite an adventure, really, even for someone who's been to the Middle East before. So - next time I talk to you will ensha'allah be from Beirut!

the girl on the right

I got a kick out of this unashamedly Republican blog.

Vote!

Am I Hot or Not??? OK, I know the answer to that question. But do me the favor of voting for (or against) me at hotornot.com. My photo's here.

Pun

For an engaging description of life as a member of the British Parliament, and a brutal pun at the end, check out this autobiographical sketch by MP Boris Johnson. Via the Edge of England's Sword.

6.25.2002

...and the reaction

The quickie story on the reaction from msnbc.com:
Yasser Arafat on Tuesday brushed off President Bush’s call for new Palestinian leadership, saying it was up to Palestinians to decide the matter in elections. Elsewhere, reaction was also cool. Arab commentators called Bush’s hardened stance “dangerous,” and the European Union stopped short of endorsing the proposal. Israel, meanwhile, welcomed Bush’s speech.

No surprises there: Israel likes it, everyone else doesn't. Hmmm... I wonder which side the U.S. is taking in the conflict? What's funny is that, from an idealistic point of view, Arafat has the moral high ground. Bush is calling for a change in leadership in a foreign country. That's traditionally a very undiplomatic thing to do, and until recently was only done in cases of extreme human rights abuses; interfering in another country's electoral or successionary process (unless it devolves into civil war) is not kosher. Recently it's become more accepted, especially among Europeans, who have tied themselves to one another in the EU and thus have something of a right to be vocal about each others' leadership. But for Bush to call for new Palestinian leadership? Risque; calling for free and fair elections without condemning the incumbants would have been ok. It's always ok for the U.S. to call for democracy - that's our ideology, and it's understood. But to call for getting rid of the present leadership?

Just imagine if Yasr Arafat came out and made a speech - before Bush ever made this statement - saying that the current U.S. leadership was "compromised" by the Jewish & Christian Zionist lobbies, and that he needed to be replaced before the U.S. could be considered a negotiating partner! Just think how we'd feel - "who are these people to tell us who to elect?" Actually, Arafat would have more of a right to do that than Bush, because it's his own conflict, and he's just saying he doesn't want this administration as the third party. Bush is the third party and is calling for one of the leaders between whom he is arbitrating to be replaced? This is sounding worse and worse as I think about it. What Bush should have done was say that the U.S. can't negotiate with Arafat, therefore it is pulling out of the conflict and will only reengage if and when better leadership arises.

That was the theoretical side. To confuse it a little are some practical realities. First of all, Arafat was not elected head of the PLO, he was appointed in 1969 or something, and has run the ship by himself. He was "elected" to head the PA in 1995, but with only token opposition and if there had been a close race fraud would have been a given. If Arafat was pitted against somebody else popular in a real, uncorrupt election, he'd probably win anyway; but we can't prove that. All this to say that, yes Bush has more of a right to call for a dictator's removal than a presidents, but no he doesn't have that much more of a right, because at least half of Palestinians support Arafat.

6.24.2002

Bush Speaks

Na-na-na-na
Na-na-na-na
Hey, hey, hey
Goodbye.
Na-na-na-na
Na-na-na-na
Hey, hey, hey
Goodbye.

Bush is singing a siren song of farewell to his erstwhile partner in peace, Yasr Arafat. He's promising to support a Palestinian state... sans the PA. My advice? Bring old Yasr back like a has-been star: rename him "Yes-man AraPhat", give him pink wraparound sunglasses, and lose the kaffeah.

Bush is also calling for withdrawal to the September 28, 2000, lines, cessation of settlement-building, and freedom of movement.

Well-written speech so far (it's going on), with a lot of substance mixed into the cliches. And he wants it all resolved within the next three years... that is to say, right before he faces re-election... ;-)

For too long, the citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear. The hatred of a few holds the hopes of many hostage. The forces of extremism and terror are attempting to kill progress and peace by killing the innocent. And this casts a dark shadow over an entire region.

For the sake of all humanity, things must change in the Middle East. It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror. It is untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and occupation. And the current situation offers no prospect that life will improve. Israeli citizens will continue to be victimized by terrorists, and so Israel will continue to defend herself, and the situation of the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable.

My vision is two states, living side by side, in peace and security. There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight terror.

Yet at this critical moment, if all parties will break with the past and set out on a new path, we can overcome the darkness with the light of hope.

Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror.

I call upon them to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.

If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence.

And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East.

In the work ahead, we all have responsibilities. The Palestinian people are gifted and capable and I'm confident they can achieve a new birth for their nation.

A Palestinian state will never be created by terror. It will be built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change or a veiled attempt to preserve the status quo. True reform will require entirely new political and economic institutions based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism.

Today the elected Palestinian legislature has no authority and power is concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable few. A Palestinian state can only serve its citizens with a new constitution which separates the powers of government.

The Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body. Local officials and government ministers need authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively.

The United States, along with the European Union and Arab states, will work with Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework and a working democracy for the Palestinian people. And the United States, along with others in the international community, will help the Palestinians organize and monitor fair, multiparty local elections by the end of the year with national elections to follow.

Today, the Palestinian people live in economic stagnation, made worse by official corruption. A Palestinian state will require a vibrant economy, where honest enterprise is encouraged by honest government.

The United States, the international donor community and the World Bank stand ready to work with Palestinians on a major project of economic reform and development. The United States, the EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are willing to oversee reforms in Palestinian finances, encouraging transparency and independent auditing. And the United States, along with our partners in the developed world, will increase our humanitarian assistance to relieve Palestinian suffering.

Today, the Palestinian people lack effective courts of law and have no means to defend and vindicate their rights. A Palestinian state will require a system of reliable justice to punish those who prey on the innocent. The United States and members of the international community stand ready to work with Palestinian leaders to establish, finance and monitor a truly independent judiciary.

Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing terrorism.

This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure.

This will require an externally supervised effort to rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services. The security system must have clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.

America is pursuing this reform along with key regional states. The world is prepared to help, yet ultimately these steps toward statehood depend on the Palestinian people and their leaders. If they energetically take the path of reform, the rewards can come quickly. If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine.

With a dedicated effort, this state could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues such as security. The final borders, the capital and other aspects of this state's sovereignty will be negotiated between the parties as part of a final settlement.

Arab states have offered their help in this process, and their help is needed.

I've said in the past that nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror. To be counted on the side of peace, nations must act. Every leader actually committed to peace will end incitement to violence in official media and publicly denounce homicide bombings. Every nation actually committed to peace will stop the flow of money, equipment and recruits to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah.

Every nation actually committed to peace must block the shipment of Iranian supplies to these groups and oppose regimes that promote terror, like Iraq.

And Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations.

Leaders who want to be included in the peace process must show by their deeds and undivided support for peace.

And as we move toward a peaceful solution, Arab states will be expected to build closer ties of diplomacy and commerce with Israel, leading to full normalization of relations between Israel and the entire Arab world.

Israel also has a large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens Israel's identity and democracy. A stable, peaceful Palestinian state is necessary to achieve the security that Israel longs for.

So I challenge Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable, credible Palestinian state.

As we make progress toward security, Israel forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to Sept. 28, 2000. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.

The Palestinian economy must be allowed to develop. As violence subsides, freedom of movement should be restored, permitting innocent Palestinians to resume work and normal life. Palestinian legislators and officials, humanitarian and international workers, must be allowed to go about the business of building a better future. And Israel should release frozen Palestinian revenues into honest, accountable hands.

I've asked Secretary Powell to work intensively with Middle Eastern and international leaders to realize the vision of a Palestinian state, focusing them on a comprehensive plan to support Palestinian reform and institution building.

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them if there is to be a real peace, resolving all claims and ending the conflict between them.

This means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.

We must also resolve questions concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian refugees, and a final peace between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and a Syria that supports peace and fights terror.

All who are familiar with the history of the Middle East realize that there may be setbacks in this process. Trained and determined killers, as we have seen, want to stop it. Yet the Egyptian and Jordanian peace treaties with Israel remind us that, with determined and responsible leadership, progress can come quickly.

As new Palestinian institutions and new leaders emerge, demonstrating real performance on security and reform, I expect Israel to respond and work toward a final status agreement.

With intensive effort by all of us, agreement could be reached within three years from now. And I and my country will actively lead toward that goal.

I can understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people. You've lived too long with fear and funerals, having to avoid markets and public transportation, and forced to put armed guards in kindergarten classrooms. The Palestinian Authority has rejected your offered hand and trafficked with terrorists. You have a right to a normal life. You have a right to security. And I deeply believe that you need a reformed, responsible Palestinian partner to achieve that security.

I can understand the deep anger and despair of the Palestinian people. For decades you've been treated as pawns in the Middle East conflict. Your interests have been held hostage to a comprehensive peace agreement that never seems to come, as your lives get worse year by year.

You deserve democracy and the rule of law. You deserve an open society and a thriving economy. You deserve a life of hope for your children.

An end to occupation and a peaceful democratic Palestinian state may seem distant, but America and our partners throughout the world stand ready to help, help you make them possible as soon as possible.

If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank in Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe, who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government.

I have a hope for the people of Muslim countries. Your commitments to morality and learning and tolerance lead to great historical achievements, and those values are alive in the Islamic world today. You have a rich culture, and you share the aspirations of men and women in every culture. Prosperity and freedom and dignity are not just American hopes or Western hopes, they are universal human hopes. And even in the violence and turmoil of the Middle East, America believes those hopes have the power to transform lives and nations.

This moment is both an opportunity and a test for all parties in the Middle East: an opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace, a test to show who's serious about peace and who is not.

The choice here is stark and simple, the Bible says, ``I have set before you life and death, therefore choose life.'' The time has arrived for everyone in this conflict to choose peace and hope and life.

Cup Fever

I'm ready and eager to jump into this party! I'll be in Lebanon for the last few games of the World Cup. Right now I'm rooting for Brazil & South Korea.

Testing...

Seeing if I can blog an image or two...




Haircut.jpg
Alexandria Waterfront.jpg

6.23.2002

Another One....continued

Z is the best man at Dave & Anna's wedding and he and his cohorts are planning the bachelor party. Now, given that this is a Christian event, they're not going to hire strippers or buy a keg. But that doesn't mean Dave won't be arrested for indecent exposure or found wandering around the streets at night smelling of alcohol.

The main portion of the party is going to have a lot of people in attendance, and is going to be a very "churchly" event, and quite tame, all things considered. Not that that's a bad thing, but the entertainment starts after most of the guests leave: the guys will pile into their cars and head down to Portsmouth, a short drive away. There, on some pretext, they'll tackle Dave and strip him down to his skivvies (note: this is the group that left Jonathan Truman in the woods with nothing but a sock). After that, accounts differ. Daniel wants to tie him to a lightpost and shoot him with paintballs till he's got welts all over... and he's OK'd that with Anna! However, I prefer Z's simpler idea: dump a beer over his head so he smells like alcohol and let him go. Walking around Portsmouth at night in his boxers he has a good chance of getting arrested. At least, that's what we're hoping: then Anna would have to bail him out in time for the ceremony!

Next prank: Laxative brownies.

6.21.2002

Another One Bites The Dust

I found out last night that one of my childhood friends got married. Yikes. Ran off with a guy, got married, and moved to California with him. I hadn't seen her in a few years - very few of her old friends had seen her - but she was a close friend, and my first crush, when I was younger.

Also, Anna Cole and David Lyndon are tying the knot in 2 weeks - she came to put up a wedding invitation in the Lighthouse yesterday. Well, they're getting married in 2 weeks IF the U.S. immigration authorities let Dave (a Brit) into the country! Apparently he's been given some trouble getting a visa... hahaha. My congrats to Dave and Anna..... but it's scary to see your friends dropping like flies!

The good news is that Z emailed Grace (the one with the pickup truck and the jump cables) about four weeks ago, and hasn't heard back from her. Gracie's in Greece, he says, but it's an encouraging sign for the Single Alliance nonetheless.

Another small piece of news: Whereas mooning was the fad last summer in the Lighthouse, this year it's a big black guy named Moses hitting people in the, ahem, vital organs. Hard. I want no part in this, please -- leaving Barnabas with the burden of carrying on the family name would be a scary proposition.

The Legend of Chocorua

In the early days of the colonial settlement of New England, a farmer by the name of Campbell settled on the outskirts of the New Hampshire colony along the Swift River. He was an amiable fellow, and got along well with the as-of-yet unsuspicious natives. One of them, a widower father named Chocorua, left his only son with the Campbells while he went on a trip to trade furs downriver. During his father's absence, the Indian lad fell ill. The Campbells, by their own account, did their best to save the boy, and leached him heavily. He died, but his body was still warm when his father returned. Chocorua suspected foul play and evil intentions on the part of the Campbells. What are the chances that a boy will suddenly fall ill and die in just a few days? And the chances that those days are the first time he's left with whites?

Chocorua took revenge. He had lost all respect for the Campbells, and convinced of their guilt he slew young Patrick Campbell, who was a few years older than Chocorua's own son had been. To the settlers, the murder was not revenge, but an unwarranted attack, making the pain of losing a son all the more bitter. At the urging of his wife, Campbell gathered all the settlers in the area and went out looking for the unrepentant Chocorua. It took a day and a half to locate him, but after that the chase was unrelenting. Abandoning his canoe, the Indian took to the woods in the thickest areas, which he knew well and the whites not at all. Nonetheless, they followed him, steadily climbing deeper into the woods and higher up the southern face of the mountains the settlers called "White". The rocky top of the highest peak in that area has changed little over 300 years, and still affords little shelter from either the elements or other humans. Chocorua, not wanting to spend his life running or leave behind the woods where he'd grown up, climbed steadily higher. At that highest peak, he stopped and faced the lagging pursuers. They had effectively spread out, and encircled the peak with precision. At a word, the peak and the lone father were raked with musketfire from all sides. Chocorua's body, considered unsanitary, was left to be picked by the birds on the peak that now bears his name.

Source: NH historical marker.

Four Days

I'm relaxing in Durham, NH, after four full days of cycling, and a good 320 miles. It's been slow in the velocity sense, due to my ~15 pounds of baggage. However, my sore backside and my body have held out, and I managed to reach the tri-city area a day ahead of schedule, spending a night at my friend Seth's house in Berwick, Maine, before continuing to Durham on schedule.

In case anybody cares, here's a short report on the trip:

Day 1 - South Pomfret, VT --> Pomfret (extremely high hill) --> Thetford --> Well's River --> Woodsville, NH --> Monroe (70 miles). Big breakfast, Subway for dinner. Spent that night on someone's property that was thick with small fir trees and very soft. Slept 14 hours.
Day 2 - Monroe --> Littleton --> Lancaster --> Colebrook --> Dixville Notch (1,780 ft) --> Errol (104 miles!). 12 donuts, 1 quart of buttermilk, and a hot dog with fixin's. Saw a moose with her two young. Paid $10 for a tent site on the Androscoggin River in Errol.
Day 3 - Errol --> Berlin --> Gorham --> Pinkham Notch (2,200 ft) --> Conway --> Albany (79 miles). 10 hot dogs, a loaf of bread, some random condiments, a soft-serve ice cream, a quart of OJ, a Friendly's burger & sundae. Two moose and a very dead deer. Slept uncomfortably near the foot of Mt Chocorua in the woods.
Day 4 - Albany --> Ossippee --> Milton --> Rochester (53 miles). Picked up in Rochester by Seth. Rode on Day 5 about 13 miles from Berwick to Durham.

6.11.2002

Dystopia

I just read Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, after finishing Crime and Punishment. Now I'm on to A Day In The Life of Ivan Denisovich by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Talk about a depressing series of books... anyway, as a fan of George Orwell's 1984, a very well-written warning against communism, it was interesting to look at the alternate dystopia in Huxley's classic.

The two dystopias have a lot of similarities, most notably the lack of a visible dictator at the top (which I think is contrary to human nature) and the strict imposition of a caste system. Both books take place mostly in London, with upper-, but not top-, echelon protagonists. Sex is used in both as the opiate of the masses, though in 1984 it is unrealistically denied to the upper-class. In 1984, the form of rebellion is a sexually promiscuous relationship; in BNW the rebellion is staged in refusal of sex and development of emotional attachment. Notably, neither book suggests a clear way out of the dystopia, which is appropriate.

Though Orwell is a far superior writer, Huxley's warning is much more valid in the modern world. In 1984, people are controlled by repression and fear. That's no fun, but it's also pretty easy to spot, and it's not hard to convince people that a rebellion is in order; you just have to convince them they can rebel and survive. By contrast, the brave new World State controls its populace by pleasure. The motto, as in all fascist systems, is "stability", and that is attained by eliminating families and any form of attachment. Passionate emotions are administered every three months, since passion is scientifically recognized as a human necessity. However, real life passion is essentially verboten, and long-term relationships strongly discouraged. Children are manufactured, conditioned, and heavily brainwashed to fill their Predestined role in society. Sex is taught as recreation, aging is medically prevented (until age 60, when all these government made and maintained human beings die quite quickly), and a narcotic ("soma") is rationed to everyone. The result? Extremely happy people, and the death of culture and pure science. It's a seductive world, and people don't want to be liberated. Much like the Matrix, liberation has to be undergone for its own sake, not for any material benefits.

Next up: Of Mice and Men, and The Color Purple.

Miracles DO happen

France was eliminated from the World Cup this morning, with 2 losses and 1 draw. The U.S. is very likely to advance with a win and a draw, and one match left to play. If they can tie or beat already-eliminated Poland, they advance regardless of what happens in the Portugal-South Korea match. If the U.S. loses, then it has to hope for a South Korea win.

And Clint Mathis has a mohawk.

Need I say more?

6.06.2002

Wow

I'm done! Three straight quarters and 6 of the last 7. I'm burned out; and nine months off doesn't seem at all too long. This past year has been enjoyable; I've really had friends at school for the first time. It's high-maintenance, in a sense, but it's fun. I guess it worked out well that I commuted emotionally as well as physically my first full year. On the other hand, now that I've made all these friends, I won't see them for 9 months, and then I'll only be here for another year before graduating. That's quite a sight short of the four or five years that most college students have to keep the same friends. But again, that's fine; I have very few friends whom I've known for more than a few years.

Life Update

So now I'm living out at Ponkapoag with my family full-time. There hasn't been any real tension, except maybe this morning, when my Dad and I got up to leave at 6:30 after a stormy night (there was lightning somewhere very nearby in the middle of the night).

I'm 198 pages into "Crime and Punishment" right now... it's actually pretty good if you can deal with the occasional choppiness of translated material. I've also taken "A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch", "Brave New World", and "A Farewell to Arms" out of the library to catch up a bit on my classics. Besides reading, there's swimming to do, probably a week-long bike trip to get in shape for, and Barnabas to play with.

I'm at school today for 2 finals. My Arabic one was even easier than I had anticipated... she didn't even put the verbal nouns on the exam! I just hope I've been well-prepared for studying in Beirut. Next I have a team meeting to put together our project, and then an exam in Int'l Econ: Finance. I hate those tests: lots of trivia, multiple choice, sometimes true-false, and then problem solving. The problem-solving I can do; it's the trivia multiple-choice that kills me.

I really don't know what I'm going to do with myself for the next three weeks. Hence the week-long bike trip. I wish I had the mental stamina to seriously study some Arabic, but I've never been able to study in the past, and right now I'm so sick of school that it's not gonna be any easier. Actually, I'm not really sick of school; I'm sick of classes. If I could be in school and not have to do any work, that would be great. Right. Never mind. So far I've enjoyed being away from computers and their attendant responsibilities. We have a radio out there, and two cars, so we're not "imprisoned", and we stay abroad the Red Sox and the world in general.

6.03.2002

Sports Guy Strikes Again

Excellent column by ESPN's Sports Guy. Thirteen levels of losing... this will make you cry if you're enough of a loser. Thanks to Bambino's Curse.

A Tale of Two Papers

My professor is going to think I'm a schizophrenic... she's having us hand in two papers on back-to-back days. One is an 8-10 page analytical paper worth 20% of our grade; the other is a 3-5 page "take-home final" (but it's actually just a short research paper) worth 35% of our grade. I wrote both in the last three or four days. The first paper was awful; an abomination to the English language. Not that the language itself was bad, but the content is absolute drivel. The second paper was quite good. Easy, and just an echo of what she told us in class, plus a little bit of original material, but I felt good writing it. OK, enough of this; I'll let these Jekyl-Hyde masterpieces speak for themselves:

Unstable Dictatorship: the Likelihood of Instability in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq

In examining the factors for stability in a country as controversial as Iraq we must look at the country from many different angles. From the perspective of the Iraqi government specifically, four possibilities or realities of instability exist, on two fronts. First of all, domestic stability could be upset either by a low-scale campaign of domestic terrorism against the government and infrastructure or by a full-scale attempt at revolution. At the same time, the threat of severe dislocation exists from outside powers, including both Iraq’s neighbors and the remote coalition against which Iraq fought the Second Gulf War. The U.S.A. and U.K. specifically have made the fourth possibility of instability a reality: frequent, but low-scale military actions within Iraq by outside powers.
For the populace of Iraq another significant source of instability exists: Saddam Hussein’s government. For Kurdish and Shia minorities in the north and south, that possible source of instability has been a reality for at least a decade. This paper, however, will focus on the prospects of the Saddam Hussein regime, and will essentially take the government’s side in blaming internal instability on agitating minorities, not government oppression of those minorities.
In order to find the probability that Iraq will suffer from any of the four noted threats to stability, we must first look at the root causes of each type, and what environments are conducive to an escalation in that type of instability. To this end, we will examine theories of roots of radicalism and revolution, and then at what legitimate threats exist in each of those categories for contemporary Iraq. Then we will look at Iraq’s history of making enemies and what actions it or others might take to escalate or mitigate the tension between Iraq and others, as well as what circumstances in the region might lead towards another war involving Iraq. By examining the likely roots of instability and whether those roots exist in Iraq, we can make reasonable predictions as to the country’s future prospects.
Domestic terrorism is the most common of the sources of instability, and does not generally represent a critical threat to most regimes. This type of destabilization is characterized by militant radical movements that have not gained enough mass support to stage a revolution or secession, and seek to gain international recognition, popular support, or government concessions by violent means. As Ted Goertzel points out in the journal “Terrorism”, these “movements are usually much weaker than the government forces opposing them” and they “find it much easier to attack unprotected civilians rather than military units” (7). Goertzel goes on to cite the general ineffectiveness of such tactics at reaching tangible goals, and in his conclusions posits that “if a revolutionary movement is too weak to attack military targets but can only place bombs on airplanes or gun down civilian bus passengers, then it is not ready for armed struggle” (10). Needless to say, few embryonic resistance movements in the Middle East have followed Goertzel’s advice. However, the ethics of resistance is tangential to a point more important for our purposes; that is, the roots of radical movements.
Revolutionary movements are based on the radicalization of a segment of the populace. Radicalization occurs when elements of civil society are forced underground, where they are not subject to examination by and accountability to the rest of society. There, instead of being able to resolve problems based on public dialogue, elements of society radicalize and become “uncivil”, resorting to violence as their means of public expression. When the revolutionary movement fails to reach the critical mass of a widespread, popular uprising, the leaders of the movement often go ahead with violent resistance to the government anyway, hoping that their support will be augmented or that they can gain concessions from the government regardless of their size. Thus, a government can often precipitate violence against itself by repressing civil society and forcing radicalization of groups ideologically or economically dissimilar to the government. A vital caveat to this process is that while repression breeds radicalism, radical elements are unlikely to either be able to or have the courage to mount violent attacks against government interests when a regime is at its most repressive. Violence tends to flair up when the government loses a measure of control or eases up on its domestic enemies: being radical and often irrational, they take any opportunity to destabilize the government even if that opportunity only comes out of the government’s attempt to ease tension (Taylor, 150). This creates a paradox for repressive regimes such as Iraq’s: if they continue to be repressive, they sow a whirlwind; if they allow civil society to express itself they reap the whirlwind they have sown over years past. Thus, the only reasonable way to avoid instability is to allow society freedom within given bounds or to be “massive[ly] and ruthless[ly]” repressive (Beetham, 147). Repression itself, however, often is initiated specifically to combat instability. All this to say there is no easy way out, especially for a regime like Saddam’s, which has repressed Islamists, communists, liberals, and conservatives alike for a quarter-century.
The other source of domestic threats to stability is similar, but on a very different scale. Mass revolts, in the form of coups, secessionist rebellions, or popular revolutions pose threats of a very distinct nature to governments. Unlike low-scale terrorism and violence revolution is a sudden and severe threat, and generally not solved without complete annihilation of the revolutionary leadership or their ascension into power. Given the inherent difficulty in mobilizing an entire population towards a single goal, revolution is unique, and if it fails the first time around, a resurrection of the same revolution in the near future is unlikely. Thus, the crucial element in analyzing causes of revolution is analyzing factors in mass mobilization. While leadership is crucial to a successful revolution, the leaders without the masses become low-scale violence and terrorism, which we have already discussed. Successful mass mobilization, empirically, is rarer than willing leadership, as testified by the plethora of militant organizations throughout the Middle East and the relative rarity of full-scale revolutions.
Economic, political and social preconditions can all contribute to the likelihood of successful mass mobilization against the government. While economic depravity seems an obvious reason to revolt against a corrupt government, empirical evidence does not necessarily uphold it. Scholars have proposed modified theories, with factors based on poverty instead of poverty itself as a contributor to revolution. The disparity between expectations and reality is cited as a more accurate predictor of the public reaction than the mean poverty level, and scholar Mehran Kamrava attributes legitimacy loss (and thence mobilization) not to “widespread poverty and misery, but rather the endemic fragility of state institutions, and in turn their inability to control and to penetrate civil society, that is the most prevalent cause of revolutions” (20). Kamrava also interestingly links social factors of revolution to spontaneous revolution, arguing that it is “through existing social organizations that the necessary links between revolutionary leaders and the masses are established” (34). Naturally, effective social organization outside the auspices of the incumbent government can contribute to a planned revolution as well, but they are vital to a spontaneous one, where the masses sometimes seem to be leading the leaders. Political theories run the gamut of revolutionary scholarship (Beetham, 220; Kamrava, 44; Motyl, 50; Taylor, 149), and I will not attempt in this space to discuss them. Clearly, though, ideological and political factors are bound to play some role in any unfolding revolution, and I personally suspect that the diversity of theory is due to the subjective nature of revolutionary politics.
Given that the two domestic sources of instability outlined above differ primarily in scale and period, the specific potential threats to Iraq in both the terror or revolutionary spheres can be outlined as one. There are many Iraqi groups opposed to Saddam Hussein’s regime, and all of them would love to see him toppled and themselves in his place. Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) in particular have been in rebellion against the Iraqi state since the early 1980’s (Europa, 2033). Communist, liberal, Islamist, and other political factions exist, primarily outside of Iraq, and are very weak. The Iraqi regime has repressed southern Shi’ites, who comprise over 50% of the Iraqi population (Europa, 2033), to a lesser degree than it has the Kurds, though the former are not a distinct ethnic group and lack a separatist agenda.
Iraq has a history rich in political coups and assassinations, which continued unabated in the 20th century. The decade from 1958 to 1968 was punctuated by three successive coups, all of them military. Since 1968 the Baath Party has ruled Iraq in relative stability, with a peaceful transfer of dictatorial power from Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr to Saddam Hussein in 1979 and frequent elections that without fail affirm the dominance of the Baath Party. Many attempts have been made on Saddam Hussein’s life; assassination or coup plots were foiled in 1979, three in 1995, one in 1996, and two in 2000, and possibly at other times (Europa, 2033-37).
Clearly the government has experience in foiling military coups as well as combating ethnic insurgencies. Were the entire army, or at least the elite Republican Guard, to join in an organized revolution, it is doubtful that the government could survive. However, despite severe sanctions, which could be interpreted as neo-colonialism, extreme internal colonialism, economic deprivation, pitiful terms of trade, and the very justified perception of threats from all over, no legitimate opposition has succeeded in organizing either a long-term (besides in Kurdistan) or large-scale mass revolutionary movement. It is not for lack of motives that no serious revolutionary or terrorist movements have sprouted in Iraq. Some argue that it is for lack of leaders, since the government liberally executes all who oppose it (Europa). However, there seems to be no lack of leaders willing to attempt coups or assassinations, and while there may be no electrifying, charismatic opposition leader, there are plenty of individuals willing to put their lives on the line for a chance to topple Saddam Hussein. I would contend that the opposition has not lacked for leaders, but has been directly prevented from organizing by the calculated repressive actions of the government.
Finally, the future prospects for the Iraqi resistance are no better than the historical results. Despite generous U.S. funding and support of the ex-patriot opposition (Europa, 2041), the latter remains essentially impotent and decidedly remote. With the government’s ability to distribute essential materials as they wish under the oil-for-food program, the populace within Iraq has plenty of incentive to not revolt. The Shi’ite majority, though poorer and less represented than the Sunnis, have not rebelled since the government’s brutal suppression of a U.S.-encouraged revolt in southern Iraq. The Kurdish movements, though they are actually established and functional, are so divided that they fight each other as much as they fight the government (Europa, 2036). Furthermore, Kurdish movements will not gain support from the average Iraqi citizen, and, if successful in fighting the Iraqi government, would demand their own independence, not a change in the Iraqi regime. The only group that could legitimately threaten Saddam Hussein would be another military putsch, this one with sufficient access to the president that they could kill and replace him before the loyalist fraction of the army and Republican Guard could defeat the insurrection. Theoretically, if the government’s revenues dropped to the point where it could no longer exercise effective control over the populace, the resultant easing in repression could lead to an explosion of anti-Saddam sentiment and perhaps a popular revolution, but such a loss of control is not expected in the foreseeable future.
Returning to our theoretical framework for sources of instability, we now turn to the likelihood of instability of an international nature. As with domestic instability, we differentiate between high- and low-scale foreign intervention, as the two have dramatically different effects upon Iraq militarily and politically. Currently, low-scale foreign intervention is a fact, and we will look briefly at its cause and likelihood of continuation before turning to the sensational issue of the likelihood of full-scale foreign military intervention.
The theoretical basis for foreign, and specifically Western, destabilizing intervention in Iraq is relatively simple. Iraq and its neighbors control a very high percentage of the world’s reserves of black crude oil, of great importance to the world economy. While many theories exist explaining American and others’ international interventions, the consensus in the case of Iraq is that national interests govern Western responses to Iraqi actions. While other variables – the situations in Israel/Palestine or Afghanistan, for instance – play a role in U.S. policymaking, oil politics is clearly the most important variable.
The ongoing low-scale foreign intervention in Iraq consists of a United Nations-sponsored sanctions regime and sporadic air strikes by the United States and United Kingdom when Iraqi troops violate imposed demilitarized zones in the north and south of the country. These draconian measures were imposed after the Second Gulf War (1990-91) to punish an unrepentant Iraq for invading neighboring Kuwait in 1990. The cause of this foreign intervention is clearly Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which is a vital oil supplier for the industrialized world, but the future of the sanctions and strikes are much less clear. If, in fear of a full-scale U.S. invasion, the government decides to give U.N. weapons inspectors unlimited access to suspected weapons sites, the sanctions may be lifted and Iraq may be eased back into the good graces of the world community. The level of Iraq’s cooperation with the inspectors, however, would have to be very high for the U.S. and U.K. not to use their U.N. Security Council veto to block a lifting of the sanctions. Thus, the low-scale instability caused by foreign intervention in Iraq can be largely attributed to actions based on respective national interests, and the continuation of the intervention is likely given current trends.
One condition that would end the low-scale intervention in Iraq would be full-scale invasion by the Western powers. Looking at the likelihood of foreign invasion first from an objective point of view, most motives to attack Iraq are likely to be based on past Iraqi aggression. Simply put, Saddam Hussein has long been in the business of making enemies. A year after taking office in 1979 he invaded Iran on weak irredentist claims. After failing to conquer the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan by the war’s end in 1988, he turned on Kuwait with similar motivations and excuses. The ongoing instability and lack of government control over the Kurdish parts of Iraq, which border Turkey, has led to occasional Turkish incursions into Iraq, and a general deterioration of Turkish-Iraqi relations over the past years. With American troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and a lukewarm relationship with the Assad family in Syria, Iraq is almost completely surrounded by unfriendly states.
Of the many who would like to see Saddam Hussein out of power, the only state that has made noise about actually invading in the near future is the United States (Bumiller). At this point it is conjecture as to whether the saber-rattling by George W. Bush, Colin Powell, and company is a precursor to anything serious or merely trying to scare Iraq into cooperating with U.N. weapons inspectors. Besides wanting to remove Saddam Hussein as a threat to the Gulf region, the U.S. has reason to believe that Iraq is sponsoring terrorists and hosts the al-Qaeda organization (Belz, 23; Hedges). If the U.S. invades Iraq, the end of the Saddam Hussein regime is a virtual certainty, and every facet of Iraqi polity would be radically changed overnight. Though some believe U.S. invasion is “highly likely” (E.I.U., 1), there is no way to be certain before the actual events transpire, and conjecture at this stage is unproductive.
In conclusion, the prospects for instability in Iraq are mixed. Instability from terrorism or low-scale domestic insurgency is relatively unlikely, given the high level of repression. At the same time, all the motives for radicalism exist, and given an opportunity the opponents of the regime may become active. Full-scale domestic revolution is extremely unlikely. Not only is there repression, but the government’s tight control over the populace makes mass mobilization against the government virtually impossible. However, in contrast to the stable domestic prospects for Saddam Hussein’s regime are the prospects for internationally-based instability. Low-scale instability, in the form of sanctions and air strikes, are in effect and likely to continue. A full scale invasion is a very real possibility as well, and the threat of it removes a degree of independence from the government, which must now behave in such a way as to increase the odds of dodging a full-scale U.S. invasion.

References
Beetham, David (1991). The Legitimation of Power. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International. Call # JC328.2.B43.1991.
Country Report: Iraq (2002). London: Economist Intelligence Unit. Accessed through NULIS, May 29, 2002.
Belz, M (2001, September 29). More than a Manhunt? WORLD. p. 23-4.
Goertzel, Ted (1988). The Ethics of Terrorism and Revolution. Terrorism, 11, 1-12. Call # HV6000.T5000.v11.
Hedges, C. (2001, November 8). Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism. The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com.
Iraq: Don’t Use Pretext of Terrorism to Attack Us (2001, October 9). The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com.
Kamrava, Mehran (1992). Revolutionary Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Call # HM281.K36.1992.
Motyl, Alexander (1999). Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities. New York: Columbia University Press. Call # HM281.M667.1999.
Orbach, William (1977). To Keep The Peace: The United Nations Condemnatory Resolution. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky. Call # JX.1977.073.
Schmemann, S. (2001, October 10). U.S. Ambassador Warns Iraq Against Stirring Up Trouble. The New York Times Online. http://www.nytimes.com.
Taylor, Stan (1984). Social Science & Revolution. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd. Call # HM281.T35.1984b.
World Report 2001. London: Europa Publications. 47th edition, 2001.

Revolution & Evolution: Elite Systems and Political Change in Libya

According to the theoretical framework for analyzing political elite systems, there exist three successive and distinct generations of elites and respective leadership types. Each generation, or genre, of elites has a distinct set of characteristics whereby it can be identified, and which a new regime of that genre can be expected to display. In theory there is a standard progression through the three generations, which may take anywhere from a few years to centuries. However, as we shall see empirically countries in the Middle East fail to follow this theoretical progression in many cases. Nonetheless, the distinction between the three genres is extremely helpful in analyzing current and historical Middle Eastern political systems, and when coupled with a flexible interpretation of the possible progressions can present a theoretical model that meshes well with empirical reality.
The first of the genres of elite systems is labeled “traditional.” The simplest to analyze, a traditional leadership system’s primary characteristic is insulation from change. Everything about the traditional elites contributes to their perpetuation and the exclusion from elite circles of new elements. Traditional elites in the Middle East and elsewhere generally include monarchs and noble classes, which maintain bloodlines and are thus impermeable to non-elites. Religious elites are generally allied with the monarchy, and the two lend each other legitimacy. Traditional elites also legitimize themselves by means of symbols and history, appealing to the national identity of non-elites to ensure submission. In the Middle Eastern world, that often entailed linking the ruling family to the Caliphate or (in Shia states) the Imamate, a strategy that dovetailed with the monarchical alliance with the religious elites. Another characteristic of traditional leadership is a high level of consensus; when consensus is lost, the traditional elite system may be broken. By having homogeneity of opinion, among other things, elites reinforce the impermeability of the structure to potential interlopers.
The second genre in the theoretical progression is “transitional elites”. This elite system, often characterized by military or bureaucratic leadership, comes about as a result of inter-elite conflict, and, as its name suggests, tends to give way to modern elites after a transitional period. In many cases, the inter-elite conflict is caused by a crisis within the traditional elite structure. The transitional leadership takes over from the traditional elite, with the primary goal of solving the crisis. If and when the transitional leadership fails to fulfill their mandate, modern, charismatic leadership takes over. Transitional elite systems are characterized by increased permeability, lack of strong ideology, and a temporary mandate.
Lastly, “modern elites”, which may be democratic, dictatorial, or otherwise, are currently viewed as the final and lasting generation of elite systems. Modern elites are characterized by charismatic, idiosyncratic leaders, whose ascendancy is based on personality and popularity rather than symbolism or crisis resolution, as is the case with the first two genres, respectively. This elite system is based on an increased awareness of the possibility of change, and is the most permeable, theoretically allowing anyone to enter the elite system based on their personality or achievement. As personalities take over the elite system, ideology becomes increasingly important. Most modern elite systems were at their inception radical or revolutionary, whether they be Islamist, communist, liberal, or otherwise. There is a theoretical assumption that modern political systems move towards liberal democracy, as they have in the West. However, dictatorship, whether military or civilian, or theocracy, as in Iran, have proved to be viable modern elite systems in the Middle East and elsewhere, challenging the Eurocentric conceptual framework.
Another challenge to the framework comes in the progression between elite structures. While theory suggests a traditional, transitional, modern progression, empirical evidence shows that this is often an erroneous assumption. In looking briefly at the to-date political development of nineteen countries in the Middle East, the author found that only one (Iraq) has strictly followed the theoretical progression. An additional six, mostly Gulf states, seem to be on track to follow the theoretical progression, but most of those still have predominantly traditional elite systems. Two countries followed very distinct paths, while four others are still too traditional to say that any progression has occurred to date. Six countries, however, seemed to follow a quite different progression with a structure of its own. They went from traditional, to modern, to transitional, in that order. Most experienced revolutions, replacing monarchs with charismatic revolutionary leaders. When those leaders died, in most cases, the same form of government continued, but under successively less charismatic leadership, which portray more characteristics of transitional than modern elites. This represents an alternate progression, varying from theory, but recognizable in its own right.
Libya is one of those countries, though it has not completed that progression, as its revolutionary leader is still alive. Libya had been an Italian colony until the Second World War, and was made an independent state in 1951. A king was appointed, and the country functioned well as a constitutional monarchy, where the king retained ultimate power, until 1969. On September 1st of that year, a group of military officers led by young Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi staged a bloodless coup against the absent king, and completely reorganized the state around their Arab nationalist ideology. Though military, the coup lacked the characteristics of a transitional regime. There was no apparent crisis to be addressed and no inter-elite conflict. Rather, the new regime, which has lasted to this day under the dictatorship of Col Qaddafi, has been ideologically based, idiosyncratic, and bound up in the charismatic leadership of the Colonel (Europa, 735).
Qaddafi’s very distinct brands of Arab nationalism, socialism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Africanism have been rejected by his neighbors by and large, though most have remained on decent terms with Libya throughout his rule. The West, on the other hand, has been very cold towards Qaddafi, whose rule began with the expulsion of foreigners, American and British military bases in particular. Because of Qaddafi’s oddball international politics and overbearing demands for Arab, Maghrebi, or African unity, Libya has become something of a pariah state. However, one is forced to wonder whether the eccentric Qaddafi really minds being a pariah to the West. He has led his country as something bordering on a personality cult for the last 33 years, and is not known for being accommodationist towards any other country. Clearly, this elite system is based on one man’s personality and ideology, and is thus a “modern” elite system.
To look at the future of Libya’s political structure is to look past Qaddafi’s lifespan. There has been no credible threat to his rule, and his people do not seem unsatisfied with their Colonel. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that he will leave office in a coffin, and his inner circle will be left to construct a post-Qaddafi political system, probably with their own political preservation in mind. Based on the experiences of Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Iran in particular, we do not have reason to expect immediate instability. Rather, the appointed heir or heirs to Qaddafi’s position will continue to govern through the same structure that Qaddafi left. However, whomever Qaddafi chooses to succeed him is likely to be less of a dominant personality, less ideological, and more pragmatic, and more focused on retaining power than attaining elusive ideals than Qaddafi is. It is not unreasonable to expect that Libyan leadership will witness a “personality strength decay” as is ongoing in Egypt, Syria, and Iran, with the successions from Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak, from Hafez to Bashar al-Assad, and from Khomeini to Khamenei and Khatami, respectively. The latter leader or leaders in every case tended to slip in the direction of transitional, bureaucratic elite structure, away from the highly personalized modern structures led by Nasser, Hafez al-Assad, and Khomeini. Thus, expect no new Libyan revolution. Libya, if it continues in the alternate elite system progression, will go from modern to transitional, just as it went from traditional to modern in the last century.

References
Economist Intelligence Unit (2001), Libya: Country Profile. Accessed through NULIS, June 2, 2002.
The Middle East and North Africa 2002. London: Europa Publications. 48th edition, 2002.
Holmes, Steven (2002). Libyan Money for Flight 103 Isn't Remorse, U.S. Says. New York Times Online. Accessed June 2, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com.